

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 012857

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ORIGIN INR-07

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 ARA-06 (ISO) R

DRAFTED BY INR/RAR:DGSMITH

APPROVED BY INR:DDR:MPACKMAN

INR/RAR - GHSUMM

EUR/RPM - DJONES (INFO)

EUR/RPM - JMARESCA (INFO)

ARA/CCA - WSIMMONS (PHONE)

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R 191546Z JAN 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO OIC PTC

INFO USMISSION NATO

ALL NATO CAPITALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 012857

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (LINE 3 PARA 6 OMITTED)

PASS FOLLOWING VIA THE NATO-WIDE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

RR RWFVA RWFVB RWFVD RWFVE RWFVF RFWFG RFWFH RFWFI RFWFK

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FROM WASHINGTON

TO AIG 6006, 6007

NATO CONFIDENTIAL FROM WASHINGTON

POLITICAL ANALYSIS: CUBA: THE FIRST PARTY CONGRESS--
CASTRO ON FOREIGN POLICY

1. THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) HELD ITS FIRST CONGRESS
FROM DECEMBER 17 TO 22, ATTENDED BY ABOUT 3,000 DELEGATES
AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM ABOUT 65 FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES.
THE FORMAL BUSINESS OF THE CONGRESS BROUGHT NO SURPRISES.
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MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT:

(A)--RE-ELECTED FIDEL AND RAUL CASTRO AS PCC FIRST AND
SECOND SECRETARIES;

(B)--EXPANDED THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PCC AND INCLUDED A FEW ADDITIONAL "OLD COMMUNISTS" IN EACH BODY;

(C)--APPROVED A NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION TO BE SUBMITTED TO A REFERENDUM IN FEBRUARY; AND

(D)--ENDORSED A FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND THE PARTY'S GENERAL POLICY PROGRAM.

2. THE PARTY CONGRESS EMPHASIZED FIDEL CASTRO'S FIRM CONTROL OF THE PCC STRUCTURE, BUT ALSO RECOGNIZED THE INFLUENTIAL POSITION THAT "OLD COMMUNISTS" LIKE CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ AND BLAS ROCA HAVE ATTAINED IN THE CUBAN HIERARCHY. THE INCLUSION OF THESE MOSCOW-ORIENTED PRE-REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNISTS UNDERScoreD CASTRO'S INCREASED RECEPTIVITY TO SOVIET ADVICE IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUT BOTH THE POLITBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMAIN DOMINATED BY MEN WHO JOINED FIDEL IN THE LATE 1950S.

3. FROM THE US STANDPOINT, THE MOST INTERESTING ASPECTS OF THE PARTY CONGRESS WERE CASTRO'S STATEMENTS ON CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY CONTAINED IN HIS OPENING REPORT AND CLOSING SPEECH BEFORE THE CONGRESS AND AT A PUBLIC RALLY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE FINAL SESSION.

4. ANGOLA. IN HIS SPEECH OPENING THE CONGRESS, CASTRO MADE FREQUENT BRIEF REFERENCES TO THE "SUPPORT THAT WE CUBANS ARE GIVING ANGOLA" BUT MADE NO MENTION OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS IN COMBAT OR OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE CUBAN FORCE IN ANGOLA (NOW ESTIMATED AT PERHAPS 7,500). THE CLOSEST HE CAME TO ACKNOWLEDGING THE FULL CUBAN ROLE WAS IN HIS TRIBUTE TO THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, WHEN HE NOTED THAT THEIR "BLOOD HAS BEEN SHED MORE THAN ONCE IN OTHER LANDS."

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5. CASTRO'S RETICENCE TO ADMIT USING CUBAN TROOPS IN COMBAT MAY BE RELATED IN PART TO ALLEGED POPULAR DISSATISFACTION AS PUBLIC AWARENESS OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA HAS INCREASED. MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, CASTRO PLAYED DOWN BOTH THE SIZE AND THE NATURE OF THE CUBAN ROLE IN ANGOLA IN ORDER TO GIVE GREATER WEIGHT TO HIS DENUNCIATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND "US-SUPPORTED" INTERVENTION. CASTRO EXPLAINED THAT CUBAN AID TO THE MPLA WAS GIVEN AS A RESPONSE TO THE THREAT POSED BY REGULAR SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS "UNLEASHED" BY THE US GOVERNMENT.

6. US-MPLA. DESPITE HIS CONDEMNATION OF US POLICY IN ANGOLA, CASTRO SUGGESTED THAT US ECONOMIC INTERESTS COULD

REACH A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE MPLA. HE MADE A POINT OF OBSERVING THAT:

(A)--OIL PRODUCTION IN CABINDA "HAS NOT STOPPED FOR A SINGLE DAY"; AND

(B)--"MPLA COMBATANTS ARE GUARDING THE INSTALLATIONS AND OFFERING SECURITY AND GUARANTEES TO THE US CITIZENS WORKING ON CABINDA'S OIL EXPLOITATION."

7. CONCERNING THIS MPLA POLICY, CASTRO STATED: "WE CONSIDER THIS POLICY A CORRECT ONE. IT IS A PROOF OF SERIOUSNESS; IT IS A PROOF OF WISDOM; IT IS A PROOF OF MATURITY OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT....IT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IS READY TO NEGOTIATE IN MATTERS CONCERNING THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES WHEN THE SITUATION IS APPROPRIATE."

8. RELATIONS WITH THE US: CASTRO COMMENTED ON US-CUBAN RELATIONS IN ALL THREE OF HIS SPEECHES, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE CHANGED CONSIDERABLY DURING THE FIVE-DAY INTERVAL BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE LAST SPEECH, ALMOST CERTAINLY AS A RESULT OF PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENT THAT CUBA'S MILITARY AID TO THE MPLA HAD DESTROYED ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVEMENT IN CUBAN RELATIONS WITH THE US.

9. IN HIS OPENING REPORT, CASTRO BRIEFLY REITERATED THE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED POSITION THAT:
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(A)--CUBA IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE "ON AN EQUAL BASIS";
BUT

(B)--"OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS" CANNOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL THE US TRADE EMBARGO IS "RECTIFIED" BY THE US GOVERNMENT.

HIS STATEMENT APPEARED TO REINFORCE EARLIER SUGGESTIONS THAT:

(A)--CUBA MIGHT AGREE TO UNDERTAKE PRELIMINARY TALKS WITHOUT FURTHER ALTERATIONS IN THE US TRADE EMBARGO; BUT

(B)--SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER REMOVAL OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY THEIR TOTAL ELIMINATION.

IN HIS CLOSING ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, HOWEVER, CASTRO:

(A)--REJECTED ANY NOTION OF WITHDRAWING CUBAN ASSISTANCE TO THE MPLA OR (ALLUDING TO EARLIER US STATEMENTS) RENOUNCING CUBA'S "SOLIDARITY WITH PUERTO RICO"; AND

(B)--DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED RELATIONS WITH THE US AT THE PRICE OF RENOUNCING THE "PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTION."

10. CASTRO ACCUSED THE US OF CLANDESTINE INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA THROUGH THE CIA AND SOUTH AFRICA AND REFERRED AGAIN TO REPORTED CIA ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE HIM, THE SUBJECT OF A LENGTHY EXPOSITION (DRAWN FROM US CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS) IN HIS OPENING REPORT TO THE CONGRESS. LATER, AT THE PUBLIC RALLY, HE DEMANDED AN APOLOGY "FOR THE TENS OF CRIMES PREPARED BY THE CIA AGAINST THE REVOLUTION'S LEADERS OVER A PERIOD OF MANY YEARS."

11. IN CONCLUDING THE PUBLIC RALLY, CASTRO SAID THAT: "WE ARE NOT THE ONES INTRANSIGENTLY OPPOSED TO NORMAL RELATIONS....WE DEFEND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS. IF THEY DO NOT WANT THESE, THAT IS UP TO THEM. FORTUNATELY, WE DO NOT NEED THEM FOR ANYTHING."
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12. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE CONGRESS LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT CUBAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR REMAIN EXTREMELY CLOSE. CASTRO'S SPEECHES WERE STUDDED WITH GRATEFUL PRAISE FOR SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO CUBA AND EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

13. CASTRO SPECIFICALLY ENDORSED DETENTE AS A DEVELOPMENT OF THE LENINIST PRINCIPLE OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AMONG STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL REGIMES." HE ATTRIBUTED US ADHERENCE TO DETENTE TO GROWING AWARENESS THAT IT IS "THE ONLY REAL POSSIBILITY FOR SURVIVAL FOR A LONGER OR SHORTER PERIOD OF THEIR OWN SOCIAL SYSTEM." HE ADDED THAT "DETENTE IS NOT YET AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS; THERE WILL HAVE TO BE FURTHER STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE IT."

14. IN HIS SELF-CRITICISM, CASTRO ACKNOWLEDGED THE SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE WISDOM OF THE SOVIET-US AGREEMENT FOLLOWING THE 1962 MISSILE CRISIS--AT ONE TIME A SORE POINT IN CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS.

15. THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE CONGRESS WAS LED BY CPSU IDEOLOGIST MIKHAIL SUSLOV, WHO READ A MESSAGE FROM SOVIET CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV WHICH EMPHASIZED THE "UNSHAKABLE MILITANT SOLIDARITY" AND "UNBREAKABLE FRIENDSHIP" BETWEEN THE USSR AND CUBA. IN HIS SPEECH, SUSLOV:

(A)--PRAISED CUBA'S "CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOINT PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR JOINT POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS";

"(B)--MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ANGOLA, SAYING ONLY THAT CUBA "EFFECTIVELY PARTICIPATES IN THE NATIONAL LIBER-

ATION MOVEMENT";

(C)--NOTED THAT "EACH REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENT INDEPENDENTLY SOLVES PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ITS OWN COUNTRY" BUT COMMUNISTS ACT TOGETHER INTERNATIONALLY;

(D)--LAUDED CUBA FOR ITS INNOVATIONS IN MARXIST-LENINIST
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THEORY; AND

(E)--STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND TO OBSERVE "SCRUPULOUSLY AND HONESTLY" TREATIES CONCLUDED BETWEEN STATES OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

16. RELATIONS WITH THE PRC: CASTRO MADE ONLY ONE SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE PRC IN HIS SPEECHES, NOTING SIMPLY THAT RELATIONS ARE BEING MAINTAINED AT STATE LEVEL WITH BOTH THE PRC AND ALBANIA (WITH WHICH CUBA RECENTLY RESUMED RELATIONS). CASTRO LIMITED HIMSELF TO A PRO FORMA CONDEMNATION OF "ANY ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND TO UNDERMINE OR DISCREDIT THE GLORIOUS ROLE WHICH THE CPSU HAS PLAYED IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY." THE PRC SENT NO REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONGRESS.

17. LATIN AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD: IN HIS REPORT, CASTRO LISTED A NUMBER OF ADVANCES MADE AGAINST THE FORCES OF "IMPERIALISM" IN THE THIRD WORLD. TURNING TO LATIN AMERICA, HE SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL COMMENDATION:

(A)--THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER GENERAL MORALES BERMUDEZ AS AN EXEMPLARY MILITARY REGIME;

(B)--PANAMANIAN CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT GENERAL TORRIJOS' ATTEMPTS TO GAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PANAMA CANAL;

(C)--VENEZUELAN NATIONALIZATION OF ITS OIL AND IRON INDUSTRIES;

(D)--MEXICAN PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA'S EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES; AND

(E)--THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (FELA).

PERHAPS TO CALM LATIN AMERICAN CONCERNS ABOUT CUBAN INTERVENTION IN THE HEMISPHERE, CASTRO NOTED THAT "LATIN AMERICA IS NOT YET ON THE EVE OF MAJOR CHANGES THAT WILL LEAD TO SUDDEN SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATIONS AS IN THE CASE
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OF CUBA," STRESSING INSTEAD THE CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND THE US.

18. CASTRO'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR ARAB POLICY AGAINST
ISRAEL WAS UNDERCUT SLIGHTLY BY VEILED CRITICISM OF SOME
ARAB STATES. HE NOTED PARTICULARLY THAT "THE CHIEF VICTIMS
OF THE OIL PRICE INCREASE HAVE BEEN THE DEVELOPING AND
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES"--A THEME HE HAS VOICED
PREVIOUSLY. KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 15 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, COMMUNISTS, PARTY MEETINGS, SPEECHES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MartinML
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE012857
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: INR/RAR:DGSMITH
Enclosure: DG ADJUSTED
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760023-0453
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760199/baaaenyp.tel
Line Count: 284
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN INR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MartinML
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 FEB 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 FEB 2004 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <03 NOV 2004 by MartinML>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POLITICAL ANALYSIS: CUBA: THE FIRST PARTY CONGRESS--CASTRO ON FOREIGN POLICY
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, CU, (CASTRO, FIDEL)
To: OIC PTC INFO NATO
ALL NATO CAPITALS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006